Ideas from 'Essential Attribution' by Ruth Barcan Marcus [1971], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Journal of Philosophy' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

11181

Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators

11184

Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

11180

Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false

11186

'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical

11185

'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

11182

If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

11183

The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects)

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation

11187

In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

11189

Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist